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I.  Introduction 
 
State citizenship grants the citizen many rights, but the rights most fundamental to a democracy 
are the right to vote and the right to run for elected office. In the traditional formulations of the 
nation-state, it has been clear who possesses these rights, but over the last half-century, 
widespread international migration has complicated the definition of the citizen and has called 
into question the perceived unity between the nation and the state, between citizenship and 
nationality, and between civic participation and national identity. In this study, I will examine 
these complications in the specific case of the Netherlands, a country particularly well known for 
its recent history of cosmopolitanism. I will examine the effect of these debates on citizenship, 
and national identity on the ability of migrants to become involved in the Dutch political system 
as well as the nature of their civic participation. From the basis of this research, I will argue that 
immigrant political participation is a useful measure of civic integration and that the civic 
integration that comes with this participation can lead to an increased tolerance of difference 
within society, which can help to create a new civically, rather than culturally, based national 
identity. Furthermore, the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in local and national 
politics helps to maintain the relevance of the Dutch state to its population in today’s globalized 
world. For this reason, research on the subject of immigrant political integration is important for 
understanding both the present and future situations of countries receiving immigrants. 
   The first major section of the essay begins by defining and presenting the history of concepts 
like nationality, citizenship, and the nation-state. I present the current academic debates 
surrounding these subjects, including questions of whether it is still proper to speak of the nation-
state as a unified entity, the effects of multiple citizenship and migration on the international 
system, as well as propositions regarding potential future forms of citizenship. To conclude the 
section, I describe the shape of the academic debate about multicultural states and 
multiculturalism. 
   The second section of the article presents the historical context of Dutch multicultural policy as 
it has changed over the past five decades. I discuss the concept of autochthony and describe the 
consequences of how it has been used in the Netherlands for present-day migrants. The third 
section presents the academic debate surrounding policies for the political integration of 
minorities. It explores the idea of descriptive representation and evaluates the value of that type 
of representation for minority groups. It also describes the general political situation of migrants 
within Europe. The fourth section places the situation of migrant politicians in the Netherlands in 
the context of other European nations. I will use this comparison to draw conclusions about the 
effect of the Dutch political system, immigration debate, and citizenship policy on migrant 
political participation, as well as the effects of migrant political participation on the national 
identities of Dutch migrants and non-migrants. 
 
II.  Theorizing Civic and National Belonging 
 
A.  Is the Nation-State Still Relevant? 
 
The model of the nation-state that saw an inherent link between national-cultural identity and 
state-civic identity developed at a time before the increasing interconnectedness and heightened 
mobility offered by modern globalization. Now, faced with the pressures of increased migration, 
the nation-state has struggled to respond. As stated by Castles and Miller, “international 
migration has changed the face of societies.”1 Globalizing trends, driven by advances in 
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communications and transportation technology, have made it easier than ever before for human 
beings to move from one place to another and communicate over long distances, with little or no 
attention to either the man-made or natural boundaries that have historically kept people apart. 
One result of this heightened mobility is that it becomes “easier to have important and durable 
relationships of a political, economic, social or cultural nature in two or more societies at once.”2 
In addition to all the positive consequences that this increased interconnectedness can have for 
societies, it also creates challenges to formerly stable systems of association. Among these 
systems is the model of the modern nation-state, a model that assumes the primacy of all of its 
citizens’ loyalty. This primacy of loyalty is now threatened by the ease with which members of 
any one state can communicate with members of any other state, resulting not only in 
international cultural flows, but also transnational flows that “ignore, subvert, and devalue rather 
than celebrate national boundaries.”3 Rather than having distinct states with distinct national 
cultures, many see a growing trend toward transnational cultures that extend beyond the reach of 
state boundaries. 
 
B.  Multiple Citizenship and National Identity in the Multicultural State 
 
Although “citizenship” and “nationality” are often used interchangeably, it is important in this 
essay to understand the ways in which the terms are used differently within academic 
discussions, and the connotations that each term has when used to discuss individual and group 
membership in a community. Both terms refer to a certain kind of belonging on the part of the 
individual to a larger whole, but they are distinct in the type of belonging. Jussi Ronkainen 
defines the terms in this way: “dual citizenship is demarcated to mean political status and rights 
and dual nationality to refer to socio-cultural belonging and identity.”4 At the time of the 
formation of the nation-state, these two types of belonging were seen as inextricably linked, but 
as we enter a globalized world it is necessary to question the hyphenation of the nation-state and 
begin to see nationality as an identity that can be uncoupled from the legal framework of the 
state. 
   Globalization has made it possible for people in different countries to feel “emotionally and 
culturally connected,” and to “ignore or at least try to ignore the national boundaries that 
separate them.”5 Responding to these increasing transnational cultural tendencies, and in order to 
remain relevant to their citizens, states have responded in two contradictory ways. First, states 
have moved toward “the rewriting [of national] identity in civic terms.”6 Prior to this 
development, national identity was largely discussed in cultural and ethnic terms, but due to the 
growth of transnational cultural identity, nation-states have been forced to look for other means 
of self-identification. Rather than looking to a shared history, states have turned to a vocabulary 
of “common values, shared interests and a set of common institutions” as the ties that bind 
members of a nation together.
7
 Second, and in effect largely counteracting the first effort, states 
have “adopted stricter immigration and asylum laws, [and] introduced citizenship tests which 
check for the compatibility of the culture of the newcomer.”8 These measures, among others, 
“indirectly aim at preserving the ideal of a cultural-ethnic character of the nation.”9 
   Marco Antonisch proposes an alternative method of binding a nation together that focuses on 
the common experiences that residents of a “politico-institutional bounded space” share, rather 
than cultural or ethnic similarity.
10
 For Antonisch, “while ethnicity (or kinship) is an important 
mechanism in generating social integration, this latter is also produced by two other mechanisms: 
the functional division of labour and the political organization of space.”11 In his article, 
Antonisch chooses to focus more on the second of these two mechanisms, arguing that the very 
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act of “living together” in the same space can help to create a “sentiment of awareness of what is 
common” that can help to bind a society together.12 
   Rainier Bauböck approaches the problem differently, and echoes Bhikhu Parekh when he says 
that multicultural societies resulting from migration must build cohesion “on a foundation of 
diversity rather than of similarity.”13 For him, the real problem with the current formulation of 
the nation-state is that it views identities as exclusive and loyalties as overriding.
14
 Bauböck sees 
a trend back towards the melting-pot model of multiculturalism, which requires “that immigrants 
must adopt the national identity of the receiving country as their primary affiliation.”15 This idea 
is flawed, according to Bauböck, due to the fact that it ignores the real influence of transnational 
migration flows on the “pluralistic transformation of destination societies.”16 With respect to this 
new paradigm, he believes that, “we should conceive of [migrant] identities as overarching and 
overlapping rather than as overriding.”17 
   Steven Dijkstra and colleagues see a similar deficiency in the current linkage of citizenship 
rights with “a specific national-cultural identity,” which results in “a situation in which not every 
resident of a state has access to full citizenship and its corresponding rights.”18 However, their 
solution to this problem is slightly different. They propose a mechanism that they label “post-
national citizenship,” which would grant citizenship rights to any resident within a state’s 
boundaries who has lived within that state for a certain period of time.
19
 The objective of their 
idea of post-national citizenship, like Bauböck’s conception of overarching and overlapping 
national-cultural identities, is not to create a mechanism “to realize a unity in society” but rather 
“to organize plurality.”20 These goals are differentiated from Antonisch’s search for a 
mechanism to generate social integration by their emphasis on “the capacity of differences to be 
united” rather than a search for “commonality” in any form.21 
   Despite the momentum behind these ideas of transnationalism and multiculturalism in the 
academic community and in certain areas of political debate, state migration policies refuse to 
reconceptualize their ideas of unitary legal and cultural belonging, even in the face of increasing 
cultural difference. What we find instead is an increasing emphasis by states on defining a single 
national identity, a phenomenon that signifies “the ‘return of the local’ in a world that believes it 
is globalizing.”22 Nowhere is this emphasis on the local more apparent than in the introduction of 
the term “autochthon” to the Dutch political vocabulary in the early 1990s as a way of defining 
those who are “of the Netherlands,” in opposition to the “allochthonous” foreign migrants. 
 
III.  Dutch Multicultural Policy 
 
In the aftermath of World War II the Netherlands began receiving large numbers and large 
groups of immigrants for the first time in its history. In the beginning these immigrants were 
mostly “repatriates” returning to the Netherlands after the decolonization of the Dutch East-
Indies, and public policy “directed at rapid assimilation of these returning compatriots” was the 
obvious response.
23
 The policy succeeded, but the assimilation of these repatriates into Dutch 




A.  Guest Workers 
 
Subsequent immigrant groups were not so easily assimilated. In order to provide sufficient labor 
for national industry, the Dutch government encouraged the temporary migration of workers 
from outside the Netherlands in the 1960s and early 1970s. At first these migrants came from 
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Southern European countries and former Dutch colonies, as well as Suriname and the Dutch 
Antilles, but demand for labor required that the Netherlands invite workers from Turkey and 
Morocco as well. These laborers were consciously not termed immigrants “so as to avoid 
creating the illusion that they were permanent settlers,” and were instead referred to as “guest-
workers,” with the expectation that they would eventually return to their home countries. The 
emphasis on the temporary nature of the guest-workers residence in the Netherlands prevented 
the government from enacting any policies aimed at bridging the gap between these workers and 
the larger Dutch society. Instead, the Dutch government enacted policies encouraging bonding 
within guest-worker communities that aimed “to preserve the internal group structures [of the 
transplanted workers] and [workers’] children were offered facilities for education in their own 
language and culture.”25 The assumption of the government was that any sort of bridging 
between these guest-workers and larger Dutch society might “hamper their return to their home 
countries.”26 
   This policy of migrant isolation led to growing tensions, and in the case of some Moluccan 
immigrants, the isolation escalated to radicalization. The resulting terrorist acts “became a 
catalyst for drawing attention to the marginalized position of these immigrants in particular and 
of migrants in general.”27 One positive outcome of this unfortunate situation was that, “for the 
first time, the issue of how to give immigrants a permanent position in Dutch society emerged on 
the political agenda.”28 
 
B.  A Multi-Ethnic Society? 
 
The Dutch government of the 1980s approached the issue of minority belonging “in the context 
of an ‘open, multi-ethnic society.’”29 In reality, this meant that rather than an isolationist policy 
toward minority groups, the government began to approach minorities as less defined by static 
group identity and more as “dynamic and heterogeneous.” It proposed a policy of bridging with 
the intent of preventing “processes of cultural isolation and socio-economic deprivation.”30 
Entailed in this policy was an emphasis on “adaptation to national norms and values,” and of an 
orientation towards the state and citizenship rather than towards “minority groups that might turn 
their backs on society.
31
 There was still a place for minority group bonding within this new 
approach to the problem, but “bridging was seen as a positive condition for bonding, as bridging 
would contribute to a better socio-economic position for minorities and consequently allow more 
room for them to experience their own cultural identities as well as secure more tolerance toward 
these minorities.”32 This multiculturalist policy led as well to an “institutionalization of 
pluralism” in the Dutch government, and an institution called the National Consultation and 
Advisory Council for Minorities was created as a tool to ensure the accurate representation of 
ethnic minority interests in policy-making.
33 
   Though in many other European countries immigrant minorities were defined by their racial 
difference, “in the Netherlands they were instead defined by ethnic and cultural origin (cultural 
non-conformity).” Although seen as more liberal at the time, this categorization has proved to be 
more resilient and equally divisive.
34
 This model, which Jan Rath termed the Minorities 
Paradigm, “legitimizes government interference with ethnic minorities” while also allowing the 
government to exclude ethnic minorities from mainstream political and economic debate due to 
their “social-cultural non-conformity.”35 This exclusion “helped to strengthen the ‘imagined 
national community’” of the Netherlands by providing a visible example for Dutch society as to 




C.  Integration: The End of Multiculturalism 
 
In the early 1990s, as government involvement in minority group bonding began to be criticized, 
the concept of “ethnic minority” also began to be “regularly replaced by [the term] 
‘allochthonous.’” This marked a shift from a multiculturalist approach to a more individual, 
citizenship-based conception of the solution.
37
 This shift was exemplified in the policy’s name 
change from “‘Minorities Policy’ to ‘Integration Policy.’”38 Structurally, this shift meant an 
increase in civic integration courses, the reduced instruction of minority languages in school 
curriculums, and, with regard to policy formation, the advisory role of immigrant organizations 
“was downgraded to a mere consultative role.”39 If they wanted to have their voices heard, 
immigrants needed to take an active role in exercising their own citizenship rights as individuals 
rather than as primarily members of a certain social group. 
 
D.  After 9/11: Assimilation 
 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the government policy shifted once again, this time to an 
assimilationist track. Rather than being seen as a tool for socio-economic integration, bridging 
between minority groups and the wider Dutch society began to include “a degree of socio-
cultural adaptation.”40 Instead of a focus on the “active citizenship” of the 1990s, which put a 
greater emphasis on the individual and the importance of individual political engagement as it 
phased out minority-group-based programs, the Dutch government, in response to populist 
movements, began to promote “common citizenship,” which includes cultural norms along with 
civic and political responsibilities. In order to avoid “being blamed for ignoring the voice from 
the street,” Dutch politicians framed the problem in the interest of the majority, rather than 
approaching it with an eye for equity, as in the 1990s, or with attention to the interests of the 
minority.
41
 Despite the seeming continuity of Dutch multiculturalist policy, in reality the past 
half-century has seen a succession of at least three distinct policies. The goals of these policies 
have not simply changed, but in many cases “the effects of policies from a particular period were 
negatively valued in other[s],” with the consequence being that policymakers began to see 
stricter and stricter measures as necessary because previous policies seemed to be failing.
42 
 
E.  The Effects of the Rhetoric of Autochthony on Migrants to the Netherlands 
 
“The most prominent dividing line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Dutch society at 
this point in time is country of origin.”43  
 
The term allochthonous, which refers to immigrants to the Netherlands or those of immigrant 
descent since the early 1990s, has its origins in geological terminology. It is used to refer to 
rocks or other minerals “not formed in the region where found,”44 and carries with it a subtext 
due to its etymology that, “allochthonous entities retain characteristics that identify them as 
‘belonging’ elsewhere many long years after their initial displacement.”45 The modern idea of 
autochthony, however, which is very closely related to the original definition of the word, is not 
simply an objective statement about the relationship between a person and his or her place of 
birth; it also constitutes a political statement implying that this connection represents “the most 
authentic form of belonging,” to the detriment of any who wish to claim a connection to a 
territory without being originally “of that land.”46 
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   In Greek philosophy this idea was articulated by Plato, using the voice of Socrates, who 
claimed autochthony as the basis of Athenian democracy when he said that, “we and our 
people…being all born of one mother, claim to be neither the slaves of one another nor the 
masters; rather does our natural birth-equality drive us to seek legal equality.”47 A sharp critique 
of this policy also comes from the Greeks in the playwright Euripedes’ tragedy Ion. In this play, 
the title character observes that: “if a foreigner, even though nominally a citizen, comes into that 
pure-bred city, his tongue is enslaved and he has no freedom of speech.”48 
   Despite the seeming inflexibility of the definition of autochthony as applied in the Netherlands, 
the status of autochthon is denied not only to those who are born outside of the Netherlands, but 
also to those with as little as one allochthonous grandparent. Although the term had been 
introduced as a way to avoid the same negative connotations that had come to be associated with 
the word “migrant,” this way of defining it assured that it would take on a similarly problematic 
meaning. The consequences of this definition are that it is possible not only to define a person 
born on Dutch soil as foreign and “not of the land,” but also to define their children, who are 
citizens of the Netherlands from birth, as foreign.
49
 Imposing such a rigid definition of the 
“other,” such that it actually creates the “other” within the Dutch citizenry, only supports the idea 
that immigrants will never be able to integrate completely.
50
 The paradox of autochthony, and 
the reason that it cannot be a sustainable response to globalizing trends, is that it “celebrates the 
primacy of being rooted as something self-evident, but it does so to enable participation in a 
world shaped by migration.”51 
 
IV.  Minority Representation and Democracy 
 
A.  Is Descriptive Representation Desirable? 
 
Although the democratic system is naturally a system of majority rule, in practice it is vital that 
every democratic system of government has certain mechanisms to protect the rights and 
advance the interests of minority groups within the state. Strict pursuit of policies in favor of the 
majority with no attention to the desires of the minority serve only to further reproduce the 
factors that distinguish these groups from one another. Therefore, those policies can only 
reproduce and amplify the dissatisfaction of minority groups who feel that they are not 
represented by their government. There are many mechanisms that can be used to create this sort 
of representation, but the most common, and the one I focus on in this study, is called 
“descriptive representation.” 
   Descriptive representation occurs when members of a minority group are elected to office in 
proportional numbers to their share of the population. Though in some cases this sort of 
representation is reached by the use of quotas, it can also be approximated by the use of 
proportional parliamentary representation (as in the Netherlands) so long as structures are in 
place to encourage minority political involvement and voting. The idea behind this sort of 
representation (rather than substantive representation in which minority interests are advanced by 
specific elected officials who may or may not share their minority status) is not just the 
controversial assertion that members of specific minority groups understand the situation of their 
identity group better than any other representative due to the shared experiences they have with 
other members of the minority group. The more important impact of this type of representation is 
that the visible presence of minorities in government helps to legitimize that government for the 
minority groups. In this way, not only do they feel as though their voices are being heard, but 
also that the state is a place that welcomes them as well as members of the society’s majority 
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identity: “The presence of minority elected officials sends out a contextual cue to minority 
citizens that the benefits of voting outweigh the costs of not voting.”52 This is the aspect of 
descriptive representation that I see as most vital for the successful integration of these minority 
groups into a society as a whole. Minority communities are often faulted for their lack of 
political engagement and civic activism, but too often the proper government mechanisms for 
minority political participation are not in place and those who wish to participate cannot. This 
not only inhibits the capacity of minorities to become active in their own government, but also 
denies them the opportunity to demonstrate their identification with a community beyond their 
ethnic group by participating in national civic society.
53 
   The reluctance of many states to provide these avenues for the political incorporation of 
minorities, despite the high degree of civic integration that this demonstrates, has its roots in the 
fear of the disassociation of the nation from the state. Having already entered the cultural and 
economic realms, entrance into the political sphere represents the final “infringement” of the 
“other” into the realm of the natives.54 Otto Bauer’s opus on the multicultural German state in 
the late 1800s provides a startlingly relevant description of the modern European situation. He 
contends that, notwithstanding the necessity of multicultural governance, the threat posed by the 
incorporation of “foreign” nationals into the apparatus of the state is that, “the despised national 
adversary now became the representative of the power of the state,” resulting in what is seen as 
“a form of foreign domination.”55 This popular perception is flawed, however, because the desire 
to become involved in the politics of the state you live in signifies a high level of affiliation to 
and identification with that state, which is exactly what most nationalists believe needs to be 
created among non-native residents and citizens. 
   In his study of the various types of legal and cultural belonging, Jussie Ronkainen found that of 
the many types of belonging, “only identification to community brings along active 
participation.”56 Similarly, in Barbara Donovan’s exploration of minority representation in 
Germany she found that, “‘homeland’ orientations [are] most prevalent in municipalities that 
‘offer immigrants few channels of access to the decision-making process and grant them little 
legitimacy in the public domain’ whereas political orientations directed toward the host country 
were more likely to be present in cases where there was more political inclusion.”57 In this way, 
“descriptive representation becomes a facilitator of social inclusion”58 as participation 
“strengthens representational links, [and] fosters more positive attitudes towards government,” 
easing the tensions between the state and minorities, and providing minorities an avenue through 
which they can contribute positively to the state in which they live.
59 
 
B.  How are Ethnic Minorities Represented throughout Europe? 
 
The European Union is home to around twenty million Muslims, a group that has in many 
countries come to be understood as synonymous with immigrant, foreign, and non-Western. 
“Muslim” has become a label of ethnicity rather than simply a religious belief. Of these sixteen 
million, fewer than thirty served in national parliaments throughout Europe in 2005.
60
 This 
under-representation is primarily the result of strict naturalization laws and the lack of proper 
mechanisms in society to allow and encourage new citizens to become involved in the state’s 
political systems. 
   One example of this systemic lack is Germany, a country that faces many similar issues of 
immigration as the Netherlands. Although Germany allows foreign residents access to state 
programs, such as welfare, housing, and public education, “political citizenship comes only with 
naturalization.”61 There is no institutional mechanism of democratic consultation between the 
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government and the Muslim community, and the Muslim/migrant community as a whole is 
generally viewed as disengaged from the political process. This perception, however, is not held 
up by the facts, as the participation levels of migrants are “quite typical, given their education 
and income levels.”62 The strongest predictors of political engagement among German citizens 
are not national or ethnic identity, but rather age and education.
63
 The perception of 
disengagement, then, is caused by the fact that many in the Muslim community are prohibited 
from becoming politically involved due to their immigration status. Instead, when they are 
refused the possibility of participating in mainstream political organizations, Muslims are often 
encouraged to join or create Muslim-only organizations, which increases the sense of the 
segregation of immigrant communities.
64
 This perception can be remedied via the adoption of 
less strict citizenship requirements or through the extension of political involvement to residents, 
as has been done in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, measures that increase 
immigrant participation in mainstream political organizations. 
   Danish law allows foreign residents of Danish municipalities to vote in local elections and 
even run for local elected office as long as they have lived legally in the country for four 
consecutive years (up from three years, prior to 2010).
65
 Participation in civic life is not tied to 
citizenship, and even as Danish immigration laws have become much stricter over the past few 
years this distinction has remained. At the peak of this open policy, in the early 2000s, the result 
was a situation in which “the number of ethnic minorities in both the national parliament and 
local councils in Denmark almost corresponds to their number in the general population.”66 The 
Danish system for local elections is a proportional system in which “the selection of candidates 
from the party list is strongly influenced by each candidate’s personal votes.”67 This means that 
candidates can move up the list if they garner more votes than those above them, a process called 
list-jumping, and it is through this mechanism that three-fifths of the ethnic minority candidates 
won in the 2001 Danish elections.
68 
   Despite the Danish electoral system’s openness to foreign citizens, a disproportionate majority 
of the elected ethnic minority representatives have taken Danish citizenship. While “60 percent 
of the minority electorate” are foreign citizens, only “25 percent of the elected candidates hold 
foreign citizenship.”69 This shows that despite the openness of the political system to foreign 
citizens, Danish citizenship is still an attractive option for those looking to get into politics in 
Denmark. Interestingly, the motivation for many ethnic minority candidates to run for elected 
office is prior employment in the public sector, specifically work that deals directly with the 
integration of immigrants into national society:
70
 “It is those building the bridges between the 
immigrant community and the municipality who have entered local politics.”71 In the Danish 
elections of 2001, for example, “26 percent of the ethnic minority representatives in local 
councils had been members of the immigration councils in the preceding years.”72 This 
demonstrates the importance and the effectiveness of integration programs that provide 
minorities with a way into civic participation. 
   The legal structure in the Netherlands is currently quite similar to the Danish system, and the 
rhetoric surrounding the issue of immigration over the past decade has made the Dutch situation 
a very interesting one to examine due to the disconnect between national political rhetoric and 
the legal frameworks that have been put together over the past five decades in response to 






V.  Immigrant Politicians in the Netherlands 
 
A.  How Does the Dutch Situation Compare to Other European Countries? 
 
The Dutch electoral system is one of the most liberal in the world. The Netherlands was one of 
the earliest European countries to grant voting rights in local elections to foreign citizens, doing 
so in 1985. Five years of legal residence are required before non-citizens can exercise this right, 
which makes it slightly more restrictive than Danish law, but still quite open.
73
 Municipal 
elections also do not require pre-registration in order to vote, another factor that makes it much 
easier for people who are not in the habit of voting regularly to participate in Dutch democracy.
74
 
Strangely enough, this enfranchisement was not the result of a long battle by immigrants 
themselves who mobilized to demand representation. Instead, it was the result of a decision by 
the Dutch political elite who, in order to maintain order and generate a sense of community 
belonging among migrants, felt it was necessary for foreign residents to be enfranchised at the 
local level.
75
 Only Dutch citizens can participate in national elections, but despite this a large 
share of immigrant-origin minorities participate. Two-thirds of Moroccans and Turks in the 
Netherlands hold Dutch citizenship, and “in the 2006 parliamentary elections, 1.2 million 
persons originating from the main immigrant countries approximately 10 per cent of the total 
electorate had the right to vote.”76 After those same elections, politicians of non-Western origin 
held 11.3 percent of the seats in the national parliament, a proportion actually higher than the 
percentage of the electorate with immigrant origins.
77 
   Representation is even better in large cities, and in most cases the number of elected politicians 
of foreign origin is proportionate to the number of foreign-origin residents of the cities.
78
 In 
Rotterdam, the city with the best rate of representation for immigrants, candidates get their 
names out through “targeted campaigns in the languages of the ethnic groups” and through 
meetings “organized through the migrant associations.”79 The result is that immigrant voters turn 
out in large numbers and take the opportunity to issue a preferential vote for a specific candidate 
at a much higher rate than do the “native” Dutch.80 Despite the momentum that immigrant 
representatives gain from the support of their ethnic communities, once they are elected many 
find themselves in a frustrating situation. On the basis of their recent electoral successes it would 
seem that immigrants to the Netherlands are both highly integrated and highly accepted, but this 
is not the case. Despite the electoral structure of the Netherlands, which supports the 
enfranchisement and representation of minority groups, the culture of Dutch national politics in 
the last decade has become increasingly hostile to immigrants. This hostility has made it nearly 
impossible for immigrant-origin representatives to advance the issues relevant to their 
communities, despite the strength of their support and their willingness to work within the 
system. 
 
B.  How does the Situation Look from the Vantage Point of the Immigrant Politician? 
 
The current situation of Dutch politics with regard to ethnic minorities is best summarized by 
one Muslim member of parliament interviewed by Jytte Klausen in 2005: “it is difficult today to 
argue that Muslims have special needs…All Dutch voters can think about is how they are 
disadvantaged by foreigners.”81 Compounding this initial prejudice, says Farah Karimi, an 
Iranian refugee to the Netherlands who held office in the Dutch Lower House from 1998 to 
2006, is the “lacking of courage” on the part of Dutch politicians “to explain certain unpopular 
policies” that actually have the interests of all Dutch at their core.82 One example of such a 
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policy, according to Karimi, is “public funding for Islamic schools or for the education of imams 
…to counter the influence of countries like Saudi Arabia on the [Dutch] Muslim community.”83 
This climate, according to a poll conducted in Klausen’s study of European Muslim leaders, is 
fostered first and foremost by negative press treatment of Muslims; secondary factors include 
right-wing anti-Islam rhetoric and the lack of economic opportunities for working age 
Muslims.
84
 The convergence of all of these factors negative press coverage, right-wing 
domination of public political conversation, the reluctance of fellow politicians to present the 
case for reasonable policies, and the strong party discipline that characterizes European 
parliaments means that, “for many Muslim politicians, who need the support of party 
colleagues to get ahead, Islam and discrimination amount to what Americans call the third rail of 
politics: ‘you touch it and you’re dead.’”85 
 
C.  The Effects of the Current Dutch Political Climate on Immigrant Political Involvement 
 
While the Netherlands guarantees full political and electoral rights to migrants, and can claim 
one of the most liberal policies in the European Union with regard to the ability of non-citizens 
to vote and even run for local elected office (a policy that has led to near proportionate ethnic 
representation in local parliaments and city councils), the Netherlands still fails to provide the 
sort of stable local consultative political structures that encourage migrants to make their voices 
heard in policy debates.
86
 Despite the impressive penetration of minority politicians into Dutch 
politics, many feel unable to adequately address the issues facing migrant communities due 
either to the need to subordinate their views to that of the party or to fears that bringing forth 
these complaints will pigeonhole them as the “Moroccan” or “Turkish” representative, rather 
than someone representing the legitimate concerns of all those who voted to elect them.
87 
   While there have been many minority politicians who have succeeded in winning elected office 
in the Netherlands, the average response to a Eurobarometer question in 2009 about how (on a 
scale of 1 to 10) the respondent would feel about “having a person from a different ethnic origin 
than the majority of the population in the highest elected political position in your country?” was 
6.4, placing the Netherlands just above average for European countries (6.2).
88
 More favorable 
responses to this question include Sweden (8.0), Denmark (7.2), the United Kingdom (7.0), 
Spain (7.1), France (7.3), and Poland (7.2), among others.
89
 The same poll reveals that only 38 
percent of the Dutch are able to declare that they would feel not at all uncomfortable with an 
elected official to national office being of a minority ethnic background (compared to 66% of 
Swedes, 53% of French, 50% of British, 58% of Danes, 47% of Spanish, and 48% of Polish).
90
 
The numbers are extremely similar when the same question is asked with regard to elected 
officials of a different religion from the majority of the population.
91 
   These results indicate a possible decrease in the number of “ethnic” Dutch who welcome 
representatives of a different ethnicity from the results of a 2006 Eurobarometer poll in which 49 
percent of respondents felt that the Netherlands needed more politicians of different ethnic 
origins.
92
 This decrease could be attributed to the persistent negative portrayals of migrant 
communities over the last decade. 
   At the same time, however, the level of political participation by migrant communities seems 
to be shrinking, a fact that is especially visible in larger cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 
where there are large communities of politically engaged migrants. In 2002, in the immediate 
aftermath of the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, when the issue of migrant cultural assimilation 
really came to prominence in Dutch national politics, only 22 percent of Moroccan-Dutch 
eligible voters in Amsterdam and 40 percent in Rotterdam turned out in the national election, but 
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by 2006 these numbers had risen to 37 and 58 percent, respectively.
93
 The year 2010 saw a small 
rise in Amsterdam, to 39 percent, although turnout among Turkish-Dutch voters fell from 51 to 
46 percent.
94
 In Rotterdam, turnout among Moroccan-Dutch fell to around 46 percent.
95
 Looking 
at patterns of representation for these communities, we see a similar pattern of slight decline in 
the recent election as the number of non-Western city councillors in Amsterdam fell from nine to 
seven, a decline that means that only 16 percent of the city council has non-Western origins.
96 
   Looking at national turnout of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2010 
confirms this pattern. Although FORUM, an institute for Dutch multicultural research, predicted 
44 percent turnout nationally among all ethnic minority groups in 2006, that number was only 34 
percent in 2010. There are many possible explanations for this decline, and the one put forth by 
the organization that carried out the study is that the debate over immigration and integration 
seemed to have calmed down in recent years, which led to decreased urgency among the migrant 
populations with regard to voting. Unfortunately, this relaxation in voting habits may result in 
less accurate representation of these migrant groups, with only 3.1 percent of council members 
nationally being of migrant origin after the 2010 elections.
97 
This number, while about two 
percentage points below the percentage of Dutch residents with Muslim cultural origins, is 
nonetheless about equal to if not greater than the percentage of naturalized allochthonous 
Dutch.
98
 What this shows is that even though the national political climate of the Netherlands has 
turned to one of exclusion of newcomers, the electoral structure of the country has made it 
possible for immigrants to gain representation. As long as this electoral structure remains 
unchanged, Irene Bloemraad posits that minority representation is “sticky” and can outlast shifts 
in public opinion against migrants.
99
 What comes of this representation is yet to be seen, and 
though migrant-origin representatives have thus far been unable to redefine the landscape of the 
integration debate, their continued presence in the debates and influence in Dutch national policy 
has the potential to ensure that the Dutch state realizes its responsibility to all of its residents and 
citizens, not just those that it considers autochthonous. 
 
VI.  Conclusion: The Effects of Immigrant Political Involvement  
on Integration and Acceptance 
 
The ability of nation-states to welcome culturally different immigrants into the governing 
apparatus of the state will be one of the most important factors in determining the continuing 
relevance of the state. The experience of immigrants to the Netherlands is affected by the 
rhetoric of autochthony that predominates in national political rhetoric, but in many ways their 
presence as civically engaged, publicly minded individuals helps to counter the imagined divide 
between the foreign and the native that Dutch immigration rhetoric has created. Despite the 
transnational cultural flows that these immigrants introduce into the territory of the Dutch state 
and the perception of many that these flows threaten the sovereignty of the Dutch state, the effect 
of immigrant involvement in politics is not a decrease in the relevance of the state, but rather the 
heightening of a civic instead of a cultural sense of nationality among citizens. This in turn 
strengthens the nation-state and helps it adapt to the modern international order of increased 
migration. However, this involvement also brings complications. At the same time that the 
introduction of minority groups into the political sphere signifies a high degree of civic 
integration, it also represents the final infringement of the “other” into the realm of the 
“natives.”100 
   Political integration is one of the best ways to create a sense of civic belonging among 
migrants. Yet without proper framing by the state, it can increase national apprehensions among 
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those who see a single Dutch national identity as intricately linked with the state. Evidence for 
both of these statements can be found in the recent history of Dutch politics: in the fierce 
opposition to the nomination for Mayor of Rotterdam of Ahmed Aboutaleb, as a result of his 
dual citizenship, and in the way that migrants disproportionately cast preferential votes for a 
candidate with a similar ethnic background as themselves. Though Dutch electoral policy still 
encourages immigrant integration into politics, in recent years it has taken certain steps that 
make migrant political integration more difficult. In this way it is obstructing the creation of a 
sense of national civic identity that could help to pave the way for closer inter-cultural interface 
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